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## Software for modeling the neural-cryptographic system

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This report is devoted to a description of software for modeling cryptographic system which is based on neural networks technology. Kinzel-Kanter protocol uses neural networks ability in mutual learning and generating common secret key [1]. In this way Kinzel-Kanter protocol solves the main problem of symmetric system - keys' distribution, since it can provide the safety exchange between sender and recipient.

The main goal of software implementation is granting the ability of experimental studying, rating its performance, reliability and safety at various parameters (learning rules, the number of perceptrons and inputs, synaptic depth limits) of neural network protocol. Besides that 3 kinds of attack (simple, geometric and majority-geometric) were applied [3].

In software was implemented the standard Kinzel-Kanter architecture: each party uses a two level neural network (TPM). The first level contains  $K$  independent perceptrons, while the second level computes the parity of their  $K$  hidden outputs. Each one of the  $K$  perceptrons has  $N$  weights  $w_{k,n}$  (where  $1 \leq k \leq K$  and  $1 \leq n \leq N$ ). These weights are integers in the range  $\{-L, \dots, L\}$  that can change overtime. Given the  $N$  bit input  $(x_{k,1}, x_{k,2}, \dots, x_{k,n})$ , (where  $x_{k,n} \in \{-1, 1\}$ ), the perceptron outputs the sign (which is also in  $\{-1, 1\}$ ) of scalar product of inputs and the weights. The values of this outputs pass through the threshold activity function and the final output bit of each TPM is defined by the product of the hidden units. Both partners initialize their weight vectors by means of random numbers before the training period starts. At each time step a public input vector is generated and the final output bits are exchanged over the public channel. In the case of identical output bits, each TPM adjusts those of its weights for which the hidden unit is identical to the output. These weights are adjusted according to a given learning rule. The following learning rules were applied: Hebbian rule, anti-Hebbian rule, Random walk and Hebbian modification rule that was found experimentally and shows high level of safety. After some time two partners are synchronized and the communication is stopped. The common weight vector is used as a key to encrypt secret messages. The simple example of encryption/decryption process was also implemented in software.

With the help of software the following results of researches were obtained [3]. Kinzel-Kanter protocol is safe when simple attack is used. For providing the safety from geometric and majority-geometric attacks reasonably to use Hebbian modification rule and synaptic depth more than 4.

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